Geopolitics and sovereignty are (once again) a driving force for the space industry

15 April 2025 | Research

Christopher Baugh

Article | PDF (3 pages) | Earth Observation| Government and Military Space| Satellite Capacity| Satellite Mobility| Satellite–Telecoms Integration| Space Ground Segment


"Governments around the world are increasingly viewing development in the space sector as a vital component of national defence and public budgets, rather than simply a symbolic effort to follow industry leaders."

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Geopolitics has long influenced the space sector. From the early USA–Russia space race to now, geopolitical dynamics have shaped government investment and support for space initiatives. Recently, a series of rapid US policy shifts, a broader global pullback from globalisation trends and the space sector’s desire to reduce dependence on a SpaceX-centric supply chain have brought space sovereignty back into focus, especially outside of the USA. Rather than being a symbolic effort to follow industry leaders, development in the space sector is increasingly seen as a vital component of national defence and government budgets. This trend is evident in China, Europe and many other countries as space capabilities quickly materialise.

China is launching space capabilities at a rapid rate

China is increasingly seen as the leading competitor to space dominance, surpassing Russia to become the second-largest player in the global space sector, behind only the US. From satellite launching to positioning systems and Earth observation platforms, China considers its developments in the space sector as vital to the country’s national interests on a global scale. One example is the country’s acceleration in low Earth orbit (LEO) constellation deployment, mainly as a response to Starlink’s global growth and threat to Chinese dominance in core belt-and-road initiative countries.

The Chinese LEO ecosystem is growing rapidly, supported by strong domestic backing. Four high-profile constellations are of note, with special focus on the Qianfan constellation (also known as Spacesail).

Figure 1: Chinese LEO constellation companies 

Constellation Operator Manufacturer Support Constellation size Satellite launches Markets
GeeSAT Geespace Geespace Subsidiary of Geely 5676 30 Narrowband (NB) and broadband
Guowang SatNet CAST, IAMCAS, private players State-owned 13 000 Broadband
Qianfan (Spacesail) SSST Genesat Secured USD930 million in a financing round led by a state-owned investment fund (2025) 14 000 72 Broadband and D2D
Yinhe GalaxySpace GalaxySpace USD1.58 billion  Provides coverage for part of Guowang1 7 Broadband and D2D

Source: Analysys Mason

Spacesail is of particular focus as the constellation represents the most similar sovereign constellation to Starlink. A mix of broadband access and direct-to-device (D2D) services mirror Starlink; in fact, the constellation is also ironically known as G60 Starlink. The entity has already signed partnerships in Brazil and Malaysia, with plans to open a subsidiary in Kazakhstan as well. Spacesail is in active discussions with mobile network operators (MNOs) in many regions, and ground antenna players are in discussions to develop the end user antennas which are critical to LEO-based service. Given these developments, it is no surprise that many Analysys Mason clients repeatedly ask, “Just how much of the addressable market will Spacesail feasibly secure?”  

To answer this question, Analysys Mason used the Non-GEO Constellations Analysis Toolkit (NCAT) to simulate how much capacity and how many users Spacesail could support in three key countries (Brazil, Malaysia and Nigeria) compared to both Starlink and Amazon Kuiper. With a base assumption of current SpaceX deployments (March 2025) and full Phase 1 constellation deployments from Amazon Kuiper and Spacesail, the results were quite telling. While Starlink and Amazon Kuiper will lead for both supply of capacity and potential users supported, Spacesail is not far off on both metrics. Early pricing from Spacesail will be especially aggressive to build demand, and Analysys Mason does expect Spacesail’s adoption to expand and revenue to grow across many countries. This is, of course, predicated on many assumptions such as adequate Chinese launch capacity, regulatory sorting and ground segment availability. However, the early momentum of Spacesail warrants close attention from any LEO player, given the size of the global addressable LEO market. In a time when even constellations such as Starlink are continuously supply constrained in portions of the network, Spacesail presents a potentially cost-effective alternative for countries seeking more affordable satellite services.

Figure 2: LEO satellite constellation capacity comparison, Brazil, Malaysia, and Nigeria, 2025 

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IRIS2 marks a positive start for satellite services in Europe, but significant development is still needed

The EU also plays a critical role in the sovereign space debate as both national governments and regional bodies re-prioritise space in their plans and budgets. A core theme across several European countries is the pursuit of ‘alternatives to SpaceX’. This approach is reflected in efforts to enhance launch capabilities, make use of a strong manufacturing base and invest in healthy space supply chains and robust LEO constellations that prioritise European interests.

Perhaps the highest profile European space play is the IRIS2 constellation driven by a public–private partnership between the European Space Agency (ESA), the EU, the SpaceRISE commercial consortium and other commercial players. IRIS2 will support both commercial and government demand for satellite connectivity. Despite delays and intense budget negotiations, the consortium came to a final agreement on the IRIS2 constellation in late 2024. 

However, while IRIS2 is indeed an encouraging development for the European space industry, Analysys Mason does have concerns this constellation is likely too late and too small to make a meaningful impact to bridging the supply–demand gap in Europe. Consider that the entire system supply – 3.3Tbit/s – will not be available before 2030, delivered via a network of LEO and medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellites. This figure amounts to just 45% of Starlink’s current capacity over a single country – Brazil. There is some speculation that recent geopolitical developments may require IRIS2 to be expanded sooner rather than later, but no public plans have yet been presented. So, while the early success of IRIS2 is encouraging, much more work (and funding) is needed to elevate European space sovereignty.

On the purely commercial front, Eutelsat OneWeb has often been touted as a viable alternative to SpaceX and a means to European space sovereignty, but this claim is far from reality today. For example, in Ukraine, Eutelsat OneWeb is highly bandwidth limited, with Starlink offering at least 22 times more capacity. The low capacity and inflexible architecture of the current OneWeb constellation are the barriers, and with funding challenges for the more enhanced second OneWeb constellation, it will be quite some time until this system represents a viable Starlink alternative for all of Europe.

Other countries are forging ahead in the space sector

The story does not stop at China, Europe and the USA. Analysys Mason has observed emerging sovereign space programmes from the likes of Australia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and many others. Lower cost barriers are a key factor here, and while some countries intend to ‘go it alone,’ others intend to forge ahead with partnerships across borders to build a more feasible technical and commercial plan. From LEO constellations to Earth observation platforms and satellite launchers, we expect more such developments as geopolitics and sovereignty increasingly dominate the public narrative.


The exact number of satellites in Yinhe’s constellation has not been made publicly available. 

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Christopher Baugh

Partner, space and satellite research and insights lead